

My presentation shall discuss §120 of Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre. Bolzano writes: »Bin ich so glücklich hier einen Irrtum, der anderen unbemerkt geblieben war zu vermeiden, so will ich unverhohlen gestehen welchem Umstande ich es zu danken habe, nämlich nur der von Kant aufgestellten Unterscheidung von analytischen und synthetischen Urteilen, welche nicht stattfinden könnte, wenn alle Beschaffenheiten eines Gegenstandes Bestandteile seiner Vorstellung sein müssten« (Wissenschaftslehre § 120). („If I am so fortunate as to have avoided a mistake here which remained unnoticed by others, I will openly acknowledge what I have to thank for it, namely it is only the distinction Kant made between analytic and synthetic judgments, which could not be if all of the properties of an object had to be components of its representation” (Bolzano, WL, §120)). Bolzano recognized Kant's insistence on the analytic/synthetic distinction as important and he drew a sharp distinction between concept and object, like Kant. And on this distinction a new notion of the theoretical concept was crafted, because it has made both Kant as well as Bolzano, aware of the errors of the traditional notion of a concept as something established by abstraction. Kant's fundamentally significant distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is necessarily bound to the further development of the concept beyond the traditional notion of the concepts of substance or abstraction. (Cassirer, E., 1910, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*, Berlin: Verlag Bruno Cassirer). The whole edifice of rational knowledge therefore rested on the so-called Ontological Argument for the existence of God (Röd, W., 1992, *Der Gott der reinen Vernunft*, München: C.H. Beck). The kernel of this argument is the claim that the notion of the non-existence of God is a contradiction; for God is perfect and existence is perfection. Leibniz added to this argumentation, saying “from this argument we can conclude only that if God is possible, we cannot conclude that he exists. For we cannot safely use definitions for drawing conclusions, unless we know that they include no contradictions” (Leibniz in: R. Ariew/D. Garber (Eds.), *Leibniz, Philosophical Essays*, Hackett Publ. Comp. Cambridge, p.25). Kant emphasized that the principle of consistency only applies, if there is an object given. The statement that “a triangle has three angles”, says Kant, “does not enounce that three angles necessary exist, but upon the condition that a triangle exists, three angles must necessarily exist in it” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 622). So Kant insisted on a distinction between characteristics of objects and parts of concepts. Bolzano has been the first to recognize this clearly and to understand the consequences.